Introduction
This paper considers the semantics and pragmatics of two Japanese adverbial expressions, yoku and yokumo, instances of which are shown in (1) and (2). 'PT' is used to gloss sentence-final particles here and in what follows. The purpose of the present paper is to describe the meaning, distribution, and felicity conditions of these adverbials, and to provide a formal account of them within a version of dynamic semantics.
Meaning of yoku(mo)
We can think of yoku and yoku(mo) as expressing the attitude of the speaker to the proposition ϕ in their scope. Both express that ϕ is surprising, but differ in that yoku expresses that the speaker feels positively about ϕ, while yokumo expresses that the speaker feels negatively about ϕ. Other subtle differences exist, as will be shown below.
It should be noted that other uses of yoku (but not yokumo) exist, on which it means 'often' or 'well,' as in (3a) and (3b) respectively. This pattern, in which a complex use of an adverbial is parasitic on a more extensional use, is common crosslinguistically. Waltereit (2001) cites German ja, which means 'yes' but also can be used as a modal particle, and eigentlich, which ordinarily means 'proper' but also has a use as a relevance-marking particle. The particle use of ja will be discussed further in a later section. In what follows, I will often write yoku(mo) to mean 'yoku and yokumo', where the two exhibit similar behavior.
Characterizing the meaning of yoku(mo)
I argue that the meaning of yoku(mo) is complex, and includes a statement of the speaker's attitude to the proposition in the adverbial's scope and location of that proposition on an exclamative-like scale of likelihood.
A first attempt at the compositional semantics of the two adverbials might look like this:
This is not quite right, for a number of reasons. The first reason is that there is a crucial difference between yoku and yokumo: the former may express a general attitude, while the latter may not.
In the following example, use of yokumo indicates that the Kings' victory was bad for the speaker in some way, perhaps a lost bet. Yoku, conversely, simply expresses regard for the Kings' success. Thus the semantics must express that the badness affected the speaker in the yokumo case. It is simple to modify the lexical entry for yokumo to reflect this difference. Here bad(s, p) should be read 'p is bad for the speaker':
However, these lexical entries still do not capture the full meaning of the adverbials, for two reasons. First, the meaning of the adverbials includes an element of shock or surprise that does not appear yet in the semantics. Second, there are complex issues with the deniability of sentences including yoku(mo).
Problem 1: Exclamatives
I will claim that the semantics of yoku(mo) is related to that of exclamatives like the sentence in (5), and that the 'surprise' part of their meaning comes from this scalar component.
(5) What a nice guy John is! Exclamative clauses have several properties related to yoku(mo) (Zanuttini and Portner, 2003) : first, they are factive, and second, the proposition that is the denotation of the clause is located at the end of a pragmatically determined scale: often a scale of likelihood. Yoku(mo) does not seem to be factive in the standard sense, for reasons to be discussed below, although sentences including yoku(mo) do entail the truth of the modified proposition. However, the meaning of these adverbials does seem to have a scalar component.
I use the following scale, which is based on discussion of even in Guerzoni 2003. In words, ϕ is more likely than ψ in w iff, given a contextually relevant set of facts, the likelihood of ϕ is greater than that of ψ.
• ϕ > Lw ψ iff Γ |= Likelihood(ϕ) > Likelihood(ψ), where Γ is a set of contextually relevant facts in w.
Given this scale, we may revise the entries for yoku and yokumo as follows, where C is a set of contextually relevant propositions which are also on the scale of likelihood. :
These formulas state that yoku(mo)(ϕ) is true iff ϕ is good/bad and is the least likely proposition in w of some set of propositions, given a set of contextually relevant facts.
The denial problem will be addressed after the next section, in which I will set up some background.
Particles and information states
This section addresses the following observation: both yoku and yokumo require that the proposition to which they apply already be in the common ground. This fact can be seen clearly by attempting to use them in answers to questions (cf. Kratzer 1999) , which must express new information from the perspective of the questioner (barring rhetorical questions). In this context, use of yoku(mo) is impossible. The badness of the examples above shows that yoku(mo) cannot simply be analyzed as factive, for if it could, the proposition in its scope could be accommodated in this situation; the question itself indicates A's willingness to accommodate. However, it is perfectly possible to use yoku(mo) if the proposition it applies to is already in the common ground, as in (8). Here, since my friend is aware of his own actions, he already knows that he has drawn the picture in question. I model the requirement for hearer knowledge in a variant of a dynamic system developed by Asher and McCready (2004) . In this system, information states are enriched to triples σ = s, E S (s), E H (s) , where E is a function from subsets s of W , the set of worlds, to epistemic possibilities, which are subsets of ℘(W ). E S represents the epistemic state of the speaker, E H that of the hearer. An epistemic state is taken to be the set of 'live' possibilities for the individual to which E is relativized. Which participant is speaker and which hearer switch with dialogue turns. I assume the existence of functions 1, 2 and 3 that map respectively to the first, second, and third elements of the information state. The first element, 1(σ), is a model of the discourse itself, updated just as in standard DPL (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) except that the elements are sets of worlds rather than world-assignment pairs. Since the topic of this paper does not involve anaphora, I have no need for assignments, and so leave them out to simplify the discussion; the semantics provided could easily be extended to include assignments should they be needed. 2(σ) is the set of possibilities that are 'live' for the speaker, while 3(σ) is made up of the possibilities that are 'live' for the hearer. Both 2(σ) and 3(σ) live on 1(σ), so the following entailments hold: 2(σ) |= 1(σ) and 3(σ) |= 1(σ).
Within this system, a given utterance can be associated with conditions on the ISs of speaker and hearer. In particular, the knowledge condition on yoku(mo) can be characterized as follows:
In words: for the update to be defined, all the speaker's epistemic possibilities must verify ϕ and all the hearer's possibilities must also verify ϕ. Assuming mutual knowledge, the result is that ϕ must be in the common ground.
What happens when it's not clear whether the hearer already knows ϕ? The condition above is not satisfied in this situation. It seems that, in this case, the sentence-final particle na is obligatory. Among many other uses (Moriyama, 2001; Noda, 2002) , na can be used to emphasize and seek agreement on a statement. Here, the speaker emphasizes his own belief that 'it rained a lot yesterday', and expresses the belief that the hearer is aware of this fact and agrees with his judgement about it. One way to understand this intuition is that use of the particle implies the speaker's certainty that ϕ is true and that the hearer also believes so. We can characterize this idea as follows in our system (thanks to Kai von Fintel for helping clarify an error in an earlier version of this formula):
On this analysis, na is eliminative just in case: the proposition in its scope is entailed by all the speaker's epistemic possibilities, the speaker believes that the proposition is true in all belief worlds of the hearer (Dox H (w), the set of worlds doxastically accessible to the hearer in w), and the hearer has not already rejected the proposition. Use of na thus expresses a stronger claim by the speaker than an ordinary assertion due to the constraints on its use. The strength of this claim leads to the emphatic quality of na-marked assertions, and the possibility of accommodation by the hearer.
Problem 2: Denial
Having set the stage, we may now return to the lexical semantics of these adverbials. What happens when yoku(mo)+ϕ is denied? The above analysis predicts several possibilities, each corresponding to one bit of the semantics (see Faller 2002 for more on this 'denial test').
• Case 1: Hearer's information state does not actually support ϕ. Then the truth of ϕ is denied.
• Case 2: Hearer's IS supports ϕ but not good/bad(ϕ). Then the appropriateness of the attitude is denied.
• Case 3: Hearer's IS supports ϕ and possibly good/bad(ϕ), but not that ϕ is unexpected. Then the unexpectedness is denied.
• Case 4: Hearer's IS supports ϕ but neither of the other parts, which are then both denied.
The semantics provided above predicts that Case 1 is impossible, because ϕ must already be in the hearer's IS for the sentence to be successfully processed, but that cases 2-4 are possible. Let us see whether these predictions are borne out. As it turns out, Case 1 is indeed impossible. This is unsurprising: since ϕ must be supported, it may not be denied felicitously. The analysis so far gets this right. Cases 2 and 3 are both possible. This is also predicted. Case 4 is impossible. This is surprising. Some modification seems necessary.
Before doing this modification, however, one may wonder why denial with uso 'lie' is impossible. I believe that the cause of this is just that A has privileged access to his own mental states (Mitchell, 1986) , so B is able only to question the characterization, not to dispute its sincerity. (13) is bad for the same reason. I will present a solution to the denial problem that makes crucial use of speech acts as related to discourse structure. This solution will be situated within Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT), a theory of discourse interpretation that enriches standard DRT with discourse relations that hold between speech act tokens (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) . In SDRT, each speech act introduces an individual SDRS labelled with a speech act referent; this is written π n : K n , where π labels K, which is an SDRS or a dynamic formula representing the content of an SDRS. Individual speech act tokens are integrated into a larger discourse structure with binary discourse relations R, so for all π j , R(π i , π j ) for some π i . R may be lexically determined or follow from inference.
I argue that yoku(mo) introduces a complex SDRS-condition (cf. the analysis of parentheticals in Asher 2000) . The basic idea is that yoku(mo) has a complex meaning. On my analysis, it introduces into the discourse model three distinct propositions: the proposition ϕ already assumed to be present in the ISs of speaker and hearer, a proposition that expresses the speaker's attitude toward ϕ (generally bad), and a proposition that locates ϕ on a scale of likelihood, just as discussed earlier.
The difference from the earlier proposal is that each of these propositions is taken to be labeled with a distinct speech act referent; as with Asher's (2000) analysis of parentheticals, the effect of this move is that the content of the subordinate speech acts does not participate in relations with logical operators such as modals and conditionals, as needed for examples like (14). The speech act referents introduced by yoku(mo) are then connected by underspecified discourse relations.
(14) a. If the party, an uninteresting social gathering, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink. (Asher 2000) b. = If the party is over and the party is an uninteresting social gathering, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink.
This representation corresponds to the following SDRS-conditions. I ignore the speaker orientation of yokumo for simplicity.
The attachment points of π 2 and π 3 are not set. I assume a constraint on attachment such that both π 2 and π 3 must attach to π 1 . Crucially, however, the order in which they attach, is underspecified. This yields two possibilities:
Taking discourse relations to connect nodes, these representations correspond to the following graphs:
π 1 π 2 π 3 and π 1 π 3 π 2 where Commentary(π 1 , π 2 ) and Background(π 1 , π 3 ).
In SDRT, denial targets a single SDRS (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) . The targeted SDRS must be on the right frontier of the discourse structure: π is available only if it is the most recent utterance or lies on a path between the node representing it and the root of the graph. Given the structures above, it is only possible to target π 1 , π 2 , or π 3 . Targeting π 2 with negation yields Case 2: denial of the attitude. Targeting π 3 yields Case 3: denial of surprisingness. It is also possible to target π 1 . In SDRT, when an SDRS is denied, SDRSs that are connected to it with veridical subordinating relations are also denied; that is, denial is transitive through veridical relations. Veridical relations are those that fulfill the following condition:
where φ R is the content introduced by the relation. Veridical relations thus are those relations that entail the truth of the two SDRSs they connect, as well as the truth of any additional content that comes from the relation itself. In SDRT, Commentary and Background are veridical relations. Therefore, if denial targets π 1 , π 2 and π 3 in the structure above are also denied by transitivity. However, since π 1 is already supported by the input state, targeting it results in a contradiction and thus infelicity.
Interestingly, some speakers seem to allow denying the attitude and scalar content simultaneously. For such speakers, the condition requiring attachment to π 1 does not seem to hold. In this case, the range of attachment possibilities widens significantly, admitting the following structures:
In the structure on the left, two possibilities exist for denials. Denial may either target π 3 , in which case the surprisingness of the proposition is denied, or it may target π 2 . In this second case, π 3 is also denied, by transitivity. The structure on the right admits a similar range of possibilities. The upshot is that, for these speakers, everything but the modified proposition itself (π 1 )may be denied simultaneously.
What happens when we add the sentence-final particle na to the SDRS? It must apply to the first proposition-that is, to the content of π 1 , in order to ensure the right conditions on the input state. Thus, only the content of π 1 changes with the addition of na, meaning that the following SDRSs can be constructed:
In the remainder of the paper I will use the earlier formalism when writing out lexical entries for yoku(mo) to enhance readability.
German ja
A number of researchers have examined the modal use of the German particle ja from a semantic perspective in recent years (cf. Kratzer 1999; Potts 2003; Kaufmann 2004) . As it turns out, ja and yoku(mo) share a number of common properties. First, ja also has requirements on hearer knowledge, and cannot be used as the answer to a question (Kratzer, 1999; Kaufmann, 2004) . Second, it appears that ja cannot be embedded under modals, which, as we will see shortly, is a property shared by yoku(mo): I will have little to say here about the correct analysis of ja, but will simply note that the analysis proposed by Kaufmann (2004) for the 'shared knowledge' requirement of ja has much in common with mine. Kaufmann analyses ja(ϕ) as presupposing ϕ within a system of dynamic modal logic. The conditions on input information states I propose are ultimately quite similar. In principle, presuppositions can be accommodated, but Kaufmann shows that the particular presupposition he assumes (that of mutual knowledge) is difficult to accommodate, making predictions similar to my own. I leave the question of whether his system could also apply to yoku(mo) for future research.
Distribution of yoku(mo)
This section describes the distribution of these adverbials, which are extremely restricted. In short: yoku(mo) is very difficult to embed, and further may only apply to certain types of proposition. I argue that this difficulty stems from a restriction on yoku(mo): the sentence that it applies to must describe some actual past or current state of affairs. I will provide evidence for this claim from constructions with modals, conditionals, attitude verbs, and negation, showing that yoku(mo) is only possible in these cases when the sentence it applies to is coerced to a description of an actual eventuality, or, in the case of attitude verbs, when the sentence can be understood as quotative.
Modals:
Neither yoku nor yokumo can appear with future-oriented modals (17,18), either within their scope, as in (17a) and (18a), or scoping over them, as in (17b) and (18b). Note that although I use the possibility modal kamosirenai in these examples, the same facts hold for other sorts of future-oriented modals, such as the necessity modal nitigainai, although I omit the relevant examples here for space reasons. Pastoriented modals are possible, however, as shown by (19). 'I can't believe you were able to make a piece this good!'
Why does this restriction exist? Two scopal possibilities exist for these sentences: M odal(Adv(ϕ)), where the modal scopes over the adverbial, or Adv(M odal(ϕ)), the opposite scoping. The first case is probably out for pragmatic reasons. Given the discussion in the previous section, the modal applies only to ϕ, not to the content of the adverbial, yielding M odal(ϕ). However, recall that the proposition yoku(mo) applies to must be already known to the hearer. Given this fact, asserting M odal(ϕ) would violate Gricean maxims and so be pragmatically odd.
This explanation, however, does not help in understanding why it is impossible to apply yoku(mo) to M odal(ϕ), for this proposition could well still be informative. The reason this scoping is out is, I argue, that yoku(mo) is lexically restricted so that it cannot be used to indicate one's attitude to situations that are not actually realized. Since future-oriented modalities by definition describe (possibly) unrealized situations, the scoping in question should be impossible if this hypothesis is correct Consider the following: If this sentence is interpreted as expressing an attitude toward Taro's trip to Tokyo (not Taro's decision to go to Tokyo next month), infelicity results. Similarly, if we interpret (b) to describe a general capacity rather than one that contributed to the success of a particular action, it is ungrammatical; (19) in fact does not describe an ability, but the actual fact of having painted a picture of high quality. I will call propositions that describe situations that have occurred in the actual world actual propositions. Given the discussion of the modal case, these facts are not unexpected. If ϕ or ψ are already known to be true, one should not assert ϕ → ψ; thus the infelicity of applying yoku(mo) to conditional antecedent or consequent. And, if yoku(mo) requires that the proposition in its scope be actual, we can also explain why applying yoku(mo) to the whole conditional is bad too. I characterize these facts formally by putting a condition on the type of proposition which can saturate the λ-term in the lexical entry of yoku(mo) to the effect that the proposition must describe a situation whose temporal trace is located at a past time, or one that is ongoing at the present moment. The need for admitting situations that are still happening at the speech time is made clear by progressivized sentences like (26) The condition is implemented in the form of a presupposition (the formula contained within braces in the lexical entries below). Effectively, this condition selects for the set of actual propositions. The final lexical entries for yoku and yokumo are then as follows, where the predicate Desc(e, ϕ) is true iff ϕ describes the eventuality e:
Conditionals
• Use of these adverbials now presupposes that ∃e[τ (e) = t ∧ t ≤ n]; that there be an eventuality that took place either in the past or at the present moment n. τ in this formula is the temporal trace function that returns the runtime of an eventuality. The additional condition p(w 0 ) additionally requires the proposition to hold in the actual world, and so forces the eventuality to have taken place there.
